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Summary  findings
Economic  decentralization  emerged  as an issue  in  Albania  government has taken steps to ensure that parts of it are
following  the firsr  election  of a noncommunist  government  locally  administered,  though centrally funded.
in Albania  in 1992. It is one of many challenges  in creating  The key to a well-designed  intergovernmental  financial
a fiscal  system  that supports reform.  system  is to clearly  define  spending responsibilities  so
Dccentralization  has begun with the central  that a revenuc system  can be designed  to accommodate
government's  transferring spending  responsibilities  them. Such a system  would combine revenue-sharing,
primarily for some local infrastructure  services  to local  own-source  revenues,  and intergoc;ernmental  transfers.
governments.  But, given Albania's  small size,  it is unclear  Tax-sharing of central government  revenues  based on
whether "peopleW  services  such as education  and health  districr of origin cannot be the only means of local
care need to be delegated  to local governments.  Although  finance in Albania,  as most revenues  are collected  in only
the destruction of local health and education facilities  a few districts.  To meet financial  needs, local
accompanying  the demise of the old regime  argues  for  governments  need some authority over significant  own-
giving communities  a greater sense of ownership of these  source revenues  (such as user charges  and property and
facilities,  they should not be handed down without  vehicle  taxes). Privatization  revenues  can also help local
mechanisms  to ensure uniform service standards.  governments  but only in the short run, as they are
Draft laws focus on the transfer of assets (schools  and  nonrecurrent.
dinics) to local jurisdictions  but are vague about  Matching grants with spillover  effects may bc
responsibiliries  for recurrent spending.  And because  local  appropriate. And for low-income  regions incapable  of
spending responsibilities  are expanding, local  meeting their spending needs alone, a rransparent,
govermments  need increased  revenues  to finance  them.  equalizing  transfer system  should be developed.  Albania's
Providing an adequatc social  safety net is vital in Albania  draft laws allow for this possibility,  having  established
the poorest of the econorrmies  in transition  - and thr  constituent and independent  budgets for the local level.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Albania  was the last of the counties in Central and Eastern Europe  to begin the process of
political  and fiscal  decentralization  and is still in the early  stages  of this process. Decentralizaton  has,
nevertheless,  been  a priority of the current  government  of Albania,  which  is also the first democratically
eleced non-owmmunist  goverment in the country's history. The government  was elected  in March,
1992,  passed  legislation  setting  up local governments  in June 1992  and  held the first elections  for these
local governmens  in July, 1992.  The Council  of Mnister  subsequendy  held a colloquium  on public
administraionreform  and  decentraization  in March  1993.' At thattime, Albaniawas  just emerging  from
some  of the most difficult  macroeconomic  circumstances  encountered  by any of the former  command
economies  of Central and  Eastern  Europe  in their transition  to mariet economies.  Recent  successes  in
macroeconomic  policy  - a substantial  amount  of price stability  was atained by mid-1993  - have  given
the  government  some  much  needed  breathing  room. This  gives  it the opportunity  to consider  construction
of a fiscal  framework  that will allow  central  and  local  govents  to be established  on a sound long-n
basis.
2.  The emergence  of greater  interest  in decenaization of goverment in Albania  is to be expected.
In  part, the desire for acrrent empowerment  by local governments  represents a reaction to  the-2  -
overcentralization,  rigid party control and tightly regimented  behavior that formerly characterized
Albanian  government  and society. In part, decentralization  represents  the public  sector equivalent  of
privatization  of the production  of private goods and services. Another  practical  reason  for interest  in
decentralization  and deconcentration  in Albania  results from the emphasis,  in a post-socialist  market
economy,  on increasing  efficiency  in service  provision.  Problems  in transportation  and  communications,
outlined  below, also make it difficult  (indeed,  always  made it difficult)  to operate a highly centralized
government  efficiently. For all these reasons, some deconcentration  of power to local officials  has
already  en  place  within  the govenment of Albania  although  the center  is proceeding  very cautiously
(the terminology  of the decentaliztion debate  is discussed  in box 1).
3.  With a population  of under 3.5 million,  Albania  is a small country  and questions  might well  be
raised  as to how  much decentralization  of govemment  is appropriate  in these circumstances.  It is clear
that we should not be considering the type of extensive decentralization  that might be appropriate in a
federal state such as Russia with its many constitaent  republics, nationalities,  language  and ethnic
groupings  and  huge expanse  of territory  covering  11  time zones. However,  the efficiency  argument  for
local responsibilities  for service  provision  as distict  from national  provision  also applies  in Albania's
dcrcstances  in some  sectors  (section  V). Indeed,  all continents  have  examples  of democratic  countries
with  populations  in the range of 3-5 million  which  have  well developed  local government  sectors  based
on a commonsense  division  of powers. These countries  - Costa  Rica is an example  - provide  possible
models  for fixture  development  of the rnlationships  between  Albania's local and central  governments.-3  -
lBo 1:  Transfers of Power from Central  Government Administration
Four types of transfer of power from centrl  govcrnmcnt  administrtion  can be distinguished  on the basis
of the organization to which powcr is tranufcmred.  The following  terns  are widcly used in the literture  to idcntify
thcse four powcr transfers.
Deconeentradon implies a shift in the authority of national government officials  away firom  those wodring
in the capital to those workng in more dispersed  locations. Some 9.1 million  lek out ofa  totalannual Budget  for the
govenunent of Albania in 1993 of 49.9 million let, or slightly more than 18  %, is delivercd in such a deconccnbtated
manner.  Seven ministries dceliver  services on a deconcentrated  basis; the major ministries invohecd  being those for
Agicure,  Constuction,  TIansport, Education  and Heath.
Deklgation of powers means that local governments undertake cetin  functions an behalf of the cental
govement.  In such delepted  fields of autnority, local g,overnments  arr  sill  subject to the control of the cntral
government and are responsible to thbe  laktcr  for their actions.  The  govermnment  of Albania has recently begun to
dclgae  mo  'omimportantpowers  and reponsibiLieto  thc newly  lected localgovernments. Thus, municipalites and
communs  have been given grants to disatibute  social assistanc  in 1993.  While the guidelncs fr  social assisance
payments have been dcveloped  by central government  ministries  and cach municipality  and commune,  has a fixed sum
to distibute,  the municipalities  and communes will themslves  decidce  which families will receive this aid and how
much each fainily will receive.
Deeentralztion  meams that fall  authority to make  and  cany  out decisions is  tranferred  to  local
governments, which are solely rssponsibk to thcir own electors for thcse decisions.
Dcvolution is a closely related tem  often used to describe the siuation where significant amounts of
legislative and fiscal authority are trnsfcrred  from central to subnational governments.
Both decentralization  and devolution  of powrs  areunderactive  consideration  by thcgovernmentofAlbania
at the presnt  time.
4.  After giving some background  data on Albania and its recent legislation concerning  local
govemment, the following sections of this chapter  will examine the assignment of functions between
central and local governments  (section  V) and their financing  (section  VI).  The system of transfers
(sectio VII and  the ongoingprocess  of intergovenmental  relations  (section  VIM)  wil thenbe eamined
A final section  provides  a summary  and concluding  thoughts.-4  -
II.  ALBANIA: EUROPE'S MOST RECENT REFORMER
5.  Albania  is among  the smallest  of the Balkan  states, with a population  of roughly  3.4 million  in
1992 and a land area of nearly 29,000 square  kilometers. About 70% of the territory of Albania is
mountainous  and the population  predominantly  lives in rural areas and is engaged  in agriculture. The
largest  city  is the capital,  Tirana,  with a population  of some  270,000,  and the  average  size of its 47 cities
is 28,000. Some  65% of the population  lives  outside  urban  areas,  and in 1992  agriculture  employed  half
of the labor  force and accounted  for half of total output (See Map).
6.  Of all the former  command  economies  in Europe,  Albania  was  the poorest,  and the most rigidly
controlled.  In emerging  from the totalitarian  period,  from 1992  to the present,  Albania  has implemented
one of the more  successful  stabilization  programs  in the region,  and  has liberalized  the major part of its
economy. In 1993,  Albania  manifested  one of the highest  growth  rates in Europe  (11 percent),  and  has
reduced  inflation  to less  than  two  percent  a month  since  mid-1993.  Virtually  all agricultural  land  has been
privatized,  state  farms  disbanded,  and most small  and medium  size enterprises  privatized. This section
briefly descriLs Albania's troubled earlier history and subsequent  macroeconomic  and struchtual
achievements,  as background  to the discussion  of decentralization  that follows.
The Legacy of the Past
7.  Until  compaatively  recendy,  Albania  was ruled by a vicious  and  paranoid  dictatorship. Under
the regime set up by Enver Hoxha, as many as three out of four families  were touched by police
repression,  according  to some  estimates  - with  family  members  being  jailed, exiled  or otherwise  harassed
for political  reasons. The number of ex-political  prisoners  of the regime is so large that they  now
constitute  a major  political  force, and a separate  Ministry  is devoted  to their  welfare. Ihe extent  to wMich1uSD  25912
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the regime  was concerned  about  threats  from abroad  is shown  by the pillboxes  that are in almost  every
field. They  are rarely out of sight in the countryside  and  will be one reminder  of the Hoxha  regime  that
may  be evident  for centuries. An indication  of the extent  of the intrusion  of the Hoxha  regime  into tie
affairs  of individuals  and families is that it made  family  planning  illegal.  The extent  of collectivisation
and associated  prohibitions  on ownership  of private property is illustrated  by the fact that private
automobile  ownership  was banned  until 1991. In 1976, private ownership  of productive  assets was
formally  prohibited  in the Constitution.
S.  The Hoxha  regime  also imposed  complete  central  control  over the economy  and kept its people
isolated  from the rest of the world to an extent  unparalleled  in any of the former  command  economies.
The policy the regime followed  from 1975 to the death of Hoxha in 1985 was one of total autarky.
Indeed, the principle  of autarky  - called  self-reliance  - was written into the 1976 Constitution. The
latter prohibited  any foreign  credit, aid or investment.
9.  The demise  of communism  in 1991-92  led to economic  chaos. For 45 years, central  planning
had decided,  allocated  and distributed  everything  in all sectors. When it was abolished,  no alternative
allocation  mechanism  was in place  and  the result was a freefaU  in economic  output. In this respect,  the
process of transition  was not too different  in Albania than from that in many other former command
economies.
10.  What  did  distinguish  Albania  from other  Central  and  East  European  economies  where  communism
also collapsed  in this period,  however,  was the breakdown  in public  order  and the physical  destruction
of social capital that accompanied  the fall of the old regime.  Some of this might seem to be the-6-
equivalent  of the population  shooting  Itself  in the foot. Thus, slightly  more  th  a third of the schools
in Albania  were badly  damaged  or destroyed  in the process. The majority  of local  health center were
also badly damaged,  with 24% of these centers  and a further 65% of local hoalth  posts being either
completely  destroyed  or occupied  by squatters. The destruction  of cooperative  and state farm  buildings
also destroyed  administrative  centers and offices  for many  rural local governments. There was also
significant  destruction  of some  goods-producing  capital,  such as the irrigation  network  on the former
cooperative  farms which  accounted  for three quarters  of  land  under irrigation. Much of the propert
that was destroyed  would  be identified  as belonging  to the local community  in many  western  states, and
its destruction  speaks  eloquently  about  the alienation  of the population  from the  former  regime,  the extent
to which  public  services  were previously  delivered  together  with a hated ideology, and the absence  of
a feeling  of local  ownership  or community  commitment  with respect  to the  activities  using  these  facilities.
11.  Although  Albania  was already  one of the poorest  countries  in Europe  before these events,  the
collapse  of central  planning  and  the breakdown  in public  order  led  to a decline  of slightly  more  than 40%
in output in 1990-1992.  The distress  of the population  was shown  to the West  in stark  fashion  in March
1992,  when  television  recorded  the arrival  in Italy  of some  20,000  youths  and men  who  had seized  ships
in the Durres  area. A recent  estimate  is that out  of 3.4 million  Albanians,  nearly  half a million  are now
illegal  emigrants  in neighboring  countries  - including  a quarter  of a million  who  left Albania  in the year
following  the March 1992 elections  which led to the installation  of the first elected  non-Communist
government.
12.  The decline in economic  output of more than 40% in 1991-1992  bad other macroeconomic
consequences.  When  output fell, so too did the principal  source of government  revenues,  from state--?7-
owned  enterprises.  Further,  control  over  most  categories  of government  expenditures  almost  disappeared.
As a result,  the fiscal  deficit  exploded  to about  42%  of GDP  in the first siC  months  of 1992. Money  was
printed  to fmance  the deficit  and  the resulting inflation  rate in early 1992  was 14%  on a monthly  basis.
Actual  inflation  for all of 1992  was 237%.
'Talble  I Albania  rAenummie  Tndlieanters
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The  1  1hwti  of Grwh  and  SbbiCty
13.  As noted,  the first non-communist  goverment in Albania  was elected  in March 1992. Its
priorities  were to launch  structura reforms  to establish  a market  economy  and  to introduce  a
comprehensive  program  of stabilization  measur.  Its success  in the latter  respect,  coupled  with high
per capita  foreign  aid flows  and  remittances  from the large  numbers  of Albanians  who  have  moved
abroad  to get work,  have contibuted  to a remarkbly rapid  economic  unaround in inflation  and
output  Mainly  through  reductions  in expenditures,  the budget  deficit  was reduced  to 16%  of GDP in
1993  by the new  government,  of which  two-thirds  was financed  by concessional  foreign  aid.
Remittances  from  those  working  abroad  al.so  contributed  $200  million,  and subsdanly  eased  the
balance  of payments. As a result  of the stabilization  program, the lek - which  had been  allowed  tofloat-was  stable  by  the begining of 1993  and inflation  in 1993  of 31  % was a far cry from the
2379%  level  of the previous  year. As of mid-1994,  iere  was evidence  of an appreciation  of the real
exchange  rate in the freely floating  market,  and  inflation  had falen further,  to 18  percent,  on an
annualized  basis.
14.  Although  admitedly  it started  frm  a low economic  base,  Albaniaes  GDP  growth  of 11%  in
1993  was one of the greatest  of all te  former  command  economies,  and  the highest  in Eumpe, east
or west. In 1994,  growth  performance  has been  similarly  robust.  While  the recovery  primarily  had its
orgin in agriculture,  constuction  and other  private  services  also expanded  substtally.  The
adjustment  process  was,  of course,  not without  costs,  particlarly for those  in the public  sector.
Unemployment  rose to about  26% of the labor  force as a result  of layoffs  in the state-owned  industrial
enterpises  and real wages  have  fallen. Nonetheless,  in  ihe  recent  Eurostat survey  , the
overwhelming  majorty of Albanians  agreed  that they  were "better  off than  before  the reforms",  a
result  which  contrasted  stingly  with the generally  pessimistic  evaluation  regee  d in other  Eastem
European  countries.
15.  The susinabiity  of the macroeCoDnomIc  adcievements  to date and  their conversion  into long
term growth  will depend  on furter  far-reaching  strucural refonns. Thus far, Albania  has privadzed
viraly  all agricultural  land, and  the output  response  has been  substantiaL.  Privatization  of trucking
and the retail  sector has been  followed  by privatizon  of small  and medium  term enterprises.
Remaining  challenges  include  the buiding of iucture  required  by the private  sector,
privatization  andior  restructuring  of the remaining  state  enterprises,  and  the creation  of a banking
system  so that credk can start  flowing  to new  acdvities.-9 -
16;  Writh  its location  close  to EU markets,  and its low labor  costs, Albania  should  be able  to
expand  trade and attract  some  foreign  mvestment  enabling  the country  to better exploit  its natur
endowments,  especially  in naturl resources,  tourism,  water  resources  and agriculture.
Se  _es  for  D  Policies
17.  Albania  remains  the poorest  state in Central  and  Eastem  Europe,  with per capita  GDP  of
rougly $340  in 1993.  There are perhaps  more  graphic  indicators  of the country's  standard  of living
than  even  these  rather bleak  income  statistics. FoX  instance,  it is estimated  that there are only  7.5
square  meters  of housing  per person  in Albania,  and the country  with the next  lowest  housing  stock  in
Central  and Eastern  Europe  is Romania  which  has 15 square  meters  per person. By way  of contrast,
Hngary has the largest  stock  of housing  in Central  and  Eastern  Europe  with 26 square  meters  per
peson.-
18.  Difficulties in tortaton  and communications  were alluded to above as makidng  it difficult
for a higbly  centralized  form of government  to be efficient The country  is mountainus and  many
villages  are inaccessible  by motor  vehicle. About  400 villages  with an estimated  population  of 1.5
million  people  are not accessible  by motor  vehicle  for part of the year. In addition,  there is no
telephone  service  to many  municipalities.  Thus, not only is Albania  poor, but there are significant
regional  dixparides  within  the country,  with  some  areas  served  much  better  than others.
19.  The poverty  of this country,  and  its previous  mimanagement  by the fonner communist
regime,  are reflected  in other  statistics  for local infrastructure.  For instance,  of the 250 water  supply
systems  in Albania,  only one provides  24 hour service  to its customers. In Durres, which  is- 10-
Albania's second largest city and principal  port, about 30% of households  with a tap get no water at
all and the remainder  get service for an average of 3 hours a day.  In the past 10 years,  the  origi  of
4 typhoid epidemics  has been taced to contamination  of its water supply.  Indeed, it is estimated  thut
from 50 to 75% of all drinking water sources in both rural and urban areas in Albania are
contaminated. Further, only 60% of prmary health care centers have any source of heating, while
only 40% have running water and 14% have basic laboratory equipment
mrive  SEi  of1  Lca  Go  in  Albnia
20.  Table 2 presents some information  on the sizes of local government  units in Albania  -
districts, municipalities,  and rural communes  - at the time of the first local elections  in July 1992.
While the 37 districts have an average size of close to 100,000, there is considerable  dispein  in
their size.  The addition of 10 new districts betwen  1991 and 1992-six of which had an urban
popuation of less  han 10,000-contributed  to this dispersion in size.  The  47 municipalities  also  w
considerable  deviation arund  their average size of roughly 28,000.  The average size of the 309  ural
communes  is close to 7,000, and it can be seen that the communes  are much more  im
size than the other units of local govemmment.  While not shown in the table, the rural 
comprise up to 24 villages, with the average number of villages per commune  being si  y over 9.
Average  vfllage size, in tur,  is 764 and is relatively homogeneous.- 11  -
;  - . *  e  . ;  . . . T.able  2.-
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:jmly1992.
Numbar  47  309
Size Range  23,789-414,367  2,534-270,000  12-18,791
Avege  Size  96,118  27,801  6,963
Standard  Deviation  79,434  49,622  1,23|
. = Dcepnt  of S  ;Ai;  Governmn  of Aibanl
21  The size of local goverments and  the degree  of urbanizadon  of a country  influence  the costs
of local governments  and the extent  to which  the latter can capture  economies  of scale  and be viable
as independent  units. Table  3 presents  some  comparative  stdstics in this respect  for Albania  and
other Central  and  Eastern  European  counties. It is evident  that Albania  is by far the least urban  of
these countries,  using the Work!  Development  Report's  definition  of urban as being the percent  of the
population  living  in cities  of more  than 10,000. At the most aggregate  level  of local government,  the
rethe or district  level, Albania's  local government  units are smaller  in size than  those  of most of its
neighbors  in Central  and  Eastern  Europe. On the other hand,  Table  3 indicates  that the lowest  level
of local government  in Albania,  comprising  the municipalities  and rural  communes,  has a larger
average  size than  that  in other Central  and East  European  countries  with the exception  of Poland  and
Bulgaria.2- 12 -
m  WETR  AND HOW TO DECENTRALIZE:  WHAT ARE
ALBANIA'S OBJECTIV?
22.  There is no single  "tight"  system  of local  government  finances:  much  depends  on what a country
wants to  achieve (see Box 2).  Balancing  objectives-efficiency,  revenue adequacy, equity, local
government  autonomy,  and the like-can be difficult.  For instance,  too generous  support for local
governments  may discourage  their own revenue effort and hence autonomy  and undercut central
stabilization  policy. Different  countries  also attach  different  priorities  to each  of these objectives,  and
these  priorities may change  over time.  Not all these objectives  can be achieved  simultaneously,  and
choices  need  to be made. In Albania  today, the overriding  objectives  in the intergovernmental  system
would seem to be: (i) consistency  with macroeconomic  stabilization policy;  (ii) administrative
simplicity;  and (iii)  sufficient  equalization  to avoid  the emergence  or worsening  of service  differentials
if key areas  such as education  and health  are handed  over to local governments,  where  the nation  as a
whole  stands  to lose if poor areas  underspend.  In addition, a means of fiacing  local infastuctre
development  is also a priority.
23.  Given  the above  discussion  of Albania's  macroeconomic.  situation,  Albania's  administrative  and
revenue constraints,  and the need for greater efficiency  in service provision,  the following  general
objectives  should  be taken  into account  in designing  its intergovernmental  system: First; administrative
constraints,  the need  for continued  macroeconomic  controls  and  the superior  taxing  power of the central
governments  (as in most counties) suggest  that local goverments wil thus remain  transfer-dependent
for some  time to come. Second,  Albania  should  more clearly  assign  spending  responsibilities  and give
expenditure  discretion  to subnational  governments  in appropriate  areas  to increase  the efficiency  of public- 13 -
mE  2:  Oh1*ist  of  dmiln  CI  mnnmt Fkancg  Sas
An ide;  al natm  of local govcrnmnt financing  would:
*  try to ensure corespondence bewten  subnational  expenditure  responsibilities  of local governments
and their financial resources (ncluding transfer  from the central government) so that functions
asigned to local govemmaens  can bc effecdvcly carried out;
*  increase the autonomy of local govenuments  by incorporating  incentives for them to mobilize
rcvenues of their own;
*  support (and not undermine) the center's  macrocOnomic  mnagement policies;
*  give expendiure discretion  to subnational  governmts  in apprpriate  areas  to increas  the efficiency
of public spending, and to improve the accountability  of local officials  to their local constituens for
provision of local services;
*  incoxporte  itergovenmental  tnsfers  tat  are  transpareat and  based  on  objectivc,  stable,
nonnegotiated  criria;
*  minimize  adminstrative costa and threrby economize  on sace  adnistratve  resourncs;
*  provide "equalzation' payments  to offset differences  in fiscal  capacity  among localitis and so ensure
that poorer localidts can offer suffcient amounts of key public services;
*  incorport  mechanisms  to support public infrastructu  development  and its appropria  financing,
. . S*  support the emergence  of a Local  govenmment  role consistent  with nmaket-orented  reforms.
spending,  and  to imprve the accountability  of local  officials  to their  local consiuents for provision  of
local  seroies.  Ihird,  larity  and  a full understanding  of the budgetary  implications  of the expenditres
assigned  to subnational  governments  is needed  to design  the intergovernmental  system  and to detemine
both  the level  of revenue  and  the revenue-elasticity  local  govenmments  will need. Fourth,  since  economic
efficiency  is an important  goal, the central  government  should  encourage  local goverment revenue
mobiliatiom For efficient  local government  operations,  some  autonomous  taxing  power  must  therefore
be assigned  to subnational  governments.  Fiffth,  for the above  reasons  and since equity  may well  be a
dominamt  goal  given regional  disparities,  a formula  grant should  weigh  heavily in the system,  and a-14-
premium  should  be placed  on developing  transparent  tbrmula  indicators  to support  some  equalization  of
per capita local government  fiscal capacity. Sixth, since many functions  suitably  delivered  by local
governments  are most appropriately  financed  by user fees and are not at present  so financed,  or have
uniform national  prices which are set without  regard to local cost conditions,  greater local pricing
discretion  will also  be desirable. Finally,  given  the infrastructure  bacldog,  the system  should  incorporate
mechanisms  to support  public  infrastructure  development  and  its appropnate  financing  by central  or local
govemmen;s.
IV.  THE  LEGLILATIVE  AND R=EGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR  DECENTRAAITION
Ihe  Constiutional  Framework
24.  Three layers  of government  are specified  in the draft  constitution  now being considered  by the
Constitutional  Commission  of the Albanian  Parliament:  the communes  and municipalities,  the 37
district goverments (the higher level of local govemment),  and the central  govenment.  The draft
consiuon  defines  the relationship  between  these layers  of government  and  the issue of the role of the
judiciary  in adjudicating  disputes  between  layers  of government  in general  terms.  (chart 1)
Recent Legislation Affecting Local Government
25.  Albania  has taken a number of steps towards  decentralizing  and deconcentrating  goverment
functions.  Most  importantly,  The  Law  on  the Organwizadon  and  Fuwfioning  f Local  Governwm  (Law
No. 7572) was passed  on June 10, 1992  and was immediately  followed  by the first local elections  of
district,  commune  and municipal  officials  in July 1992.Figure  1 Goverment structure
Local  Central  government
government  Council  of  Ministers
Ministries  Prefectures
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__________  l  I___,,  _
Ministry  of
Rethes  ,  Ii.* *  ..  Fi
(37  districts)  -
Bashlsi  Communa
(47  municipalities)  (309  rural  communes)
Note:  According  to  the  draft  Constitution,  local  governments  and  the  central  government  have  equal
power.  Dotted  lines  indicate  the  Ministry  of  Finance  is  the  principal  source  of  funding  for  local
governments.- 15-
26.  The  problems  that  have  emnerged  since  the  local  elections  have  their  origin  primarily  in vagueness
in this Law, which  gave  local  governments  an impressive  number  of responsibilities  but did not specify
either  how  these responsibilities  were to be financed,  or the division  of labor where  local and national
govermments  share responsibilities.
27.  The division  of powers  and the fiscal  capacity  to carry  out these  powers  need  to be clarified  to
promote  accountability  of both levels  of government.  Until these  problems  are resolved,  there is also
likely  to be considerable  frustration  of central  and  local government  officials  leading  to a corresponding
amount  of intergovernmental  tension. In addition,  lapses  in service  provision  may  occur  if responsibilities
remain  unclear.
'28.  The government  of Albania  moved  to address  these  outstanding  issues  inmid-1993  by establishing
an intergovernmental  Task  Force  on decentralization  charged  with  preparng legislation  on  the functional
responsibilities  and financing  of local governmet  This legislation  consists  of: (i) a Law on Local
Budgets;  Cn)  amendments  to the Law on The Tax System in the Republic of Albania and a Law on  Asset
Ownersip ofLocal Government. The first two address the financing of local government and deal with
both transfers  from the central  government  and revenue  sources  that the local govemments  have the
power  to tap themselves-  The Law on The  Asset Ownersh*p  of Local Gow>ment  is an indirect  attempt
to assign  spending  responsibilities  to local governments  by allocating  ownership  of govrnmental  assets
between  central  and local governments.  'The  status  of this legislation  as of the first quarter  of 1994 is
that theLaw  on Local  Budgets  was passed  by Parliament  on December  22, 1993  (Law  No. 7776), while
the other legislation  is in draft fbrm and is still being considered  wihin the government. These laws
address  the key  dimensions  of designing  an  intergovernment  system:  the allocation  offunctions  and  their- 16  -
financing.
Prfectures
29.  Another  interesting  development  in the  process  of decentralization  and  deconcentration  in  Albania
has been  the introduction  of a prefecture  system. The prefecture  system  in other countries  which  have
such an institution  is the regional  ann of the central  government,  although  the importance  of the prefects
has greatly  diminished  with  the rise of elected  subnational  governments  in countries  such  as France.
30.  The  Law of Prefectures  (Law  No.7608)  was passed  on September  22, 1992. The introduction
of this Law closely  followed  the first local govenment elections,  in which  the opposition  parties in
Parliament  did much  better  than  they  had in the previous  national  elections  in March  1992. The primary
objective  of the prefectures  is stated  in the Law  of the Prefectures  as being "to coordinate  the activity  of
the ministries  and  other central  institutions  in the administrative  territorial  units". Article  l  of the Law
indicates  that the prefectures  are not to have supervisory  powers over departnents of the central
govenment,  however:  any  disputes  between  the prefectures  and  the departments  are to be settled  by the
Council  of Ministers.
31.  Article  4 of the Law of Prefectures  is careful  to specify  that the Prefectres and elected  local
governments  are to be totally  independent  institutions.  The prefectures  are, however,  given  the right  to
stay local goverment by-laws or  legislation  while the  courts decide whether this legislation is
constittional. The Law  on Local  Budget  indicates  that  the Prefectures  are  to have  no responsibilities
with  respectto  local  govenmentbudgets;  the Law  specifies  that a copy  of these  local  budgets  are simply
to be forwarded  to the relevant  Prefecturs for information.- 17 -
32.  The functions  of the  Prefectures  therefore  remain  somewhat  of a mystery  at the present. In July
1993,  however,  the government  approved  the formation  of 12 Prefectures  with a total establishment  of
180  positions. It may  be that the prefects  will have  potential  significance.  The  Law of the Prefectures
emphasizes  a substantial  role for them in internal  security:  they  are to be responsible  for civil  defence,
for example,  and to "supervise"  toe police.
V.  ASSIGNING EXPENDITURES
Plriniples of Expenditure Assignment
33.  What  are the respective  roles of central  and subnational  governments?  Typical  functions  of both
levels  of govermnent  are  indicated  in Box  3. Traditional  public  finance  theory  suggests  that  an "efficient"
expenditure  assignment  between  levels  of government  is  based  on the  geographic  dimensions  of benefits.
'hat means,  ideally,  that  each  locality  should  provide,  and  pay for, services  whose  benefits  accrue  within
its boundaries,  and, to the extent  possible,  spending  responsibilities  should  be given  to the lowest  level
of government  consistent ith  the efficient  perfomance of that service. The reasonig  is that local
populations  with differing  tastes  and  preferences  will receive  those  public  services  which  they  want-not
what is centaIly determined. Thus, the center  will be responsible  for functions  with national  benefits
while  loca governments  will provide  services  to benefit  local  residents.
34.  This decentralization  principle  has important  corollaries. Where  there are important  economies
of scale, for instance,  it may  make  sense  to centralize  provision  of such services. In addition,  a case  is
often  made  for central  government  involvement  in sectors  such  as health and  education  on the grounds
of "spillover  effects",  or "externalities."  Spending  in these sectors  is important  for national  economic- 18-
Box  3:  Who Does What? Functions  of Central and Local Governments
Typical  Central Function.  Among the functions  commonly  assigned  to the central level of govcmment  are:
defense, post, and telccommunications;  national  roads and highways,  poiu and civil aviation (if these are in government
hands at all).  Then  services provide benefits beyond any one local jurisdiction  and are typically  the responsibility  of
the  national budget  The courts,  enforcement of  national laws,  foreign afrairs and  diplomacy, industrial and
environmentl lcgislation  and intenregional  commerce  are also usually  seen as 'national level" functions  of government.
Typical Local Functions.  Among  the public services best delivecred  at the local level (with local decision-
makers deciding  what services am provided, to whom, and in what quantity  and quality)  are: transportation  services such
as construction  and maintenance  of local roads and provision of public trmnsit;  security  scrvices such as fire protection
and enforcement  of local laws; public  utilities  such as those for water, sewage  and various forms of energy distribution;
general urban services such as provision of parks, recreation facilitics, markets and slaughter-houscs. These are alt
eximples of services whose benefits favor the local area, and which are often provided  by local govermments.
Spilbvers.  In between are cxpenditures  on education  and health and social welfare. On the one hand local
schools and clinics clearly benefit rcsidents  of the local area; on the othcr, a wcl-cducatcd and healthy population  has
national  benefits  also. Because  of these  benefit 'spill-overs", the responsibility  for education  and health  is oftcn  a national
one, or when it is local, the central govermcnt may assist local govemmcnts  in providing  services to a certain standard.
In the later instance, the srvice  is delegated, but not fully decentmlized.
Shared Responibilities.  Sometimes  both kves  of government  share spending responsibility  within a sector:
local governments may provide  tindergarten and primary education wfit  Lhe  central govement  providing higher
education, for instance.  In practicc, thcre is much variability in spcnding responsibilitics  and while the allocation of
functions  described here provides a guide, the decisions  as to which level of government  provides a service ar  as much
a finction of t country's historical and political  heritage and tradition of local autonony as of the economic efficiency
principles we have outlined.
Govemnment  Provision versus Privatization.  The  assignment  of functions  between  the levels of govcnmuent
might seem to be complicated in the economics in transition by the fact that provision of many goods and scrvices
previously supplied by govcrnments  are now being privatizcd.  In fact, the extent to which goods and services now
supplied  by governments  are public rather than private goods is debatable  even in the market economics. Many market
economies  are currently privatizing functions  such as utilities  in transportation  and communications;  even entire postl
systems  are bcing considered for privatzation in some countries.
Responsibilit  versus Delivery.  Finally, govemments need not always  themselves directy provide services
for which thcy are responsible. In market economies,  many local governments  contact for serviocs  to be delivered by
the private sector  garbage collection is a typical  example.  Local governents  can even contact with higher levels of
governmcnt  Canada's Royal Canadian Mounted Police supplies services under contract to many provinces and
municipalities. Equally, even if the central govermment  is responsible  for functions such as poverty rdief,  it does not
need to deliver the required services itself and can delegate these functions to local goverments.  For instmce, the
Albanian  social assistance  progrm,  ndihme economike,  is centrally funded  but managed by local govemnments.
development  and national  welfare  and income  distrbution, and if left to local governments  alone,  they
may  not provide  enough  of  these  services  because  only some  of the benefits  will accrue  to their local-19
residents.  Commonly,  the central government  may delegate responsibility  for functions  with such
external  benefits  to local  governments  but also provide  transfers  to increase  their supply. In transition
economies,  it is also often  argued  that responsibility  for the social safety  net should  not be left to local
goverments.  If one believes  that the provision  of a safety  net Is a national  priority  during  the difficult
transition  ahead,  then  the center  should  have  a predominant  role in its financing  (as it does  in Albania).
Who Does What  in Albania?
35.  The traditional  "benefit  area"  division  of responsibilities  between  central  and  local  govements,
based  on public  finance  theory,  holds  that  local  governments  should  provide  services  ftat benefit  the local
jurisdiction  while the central  govermnent  provides  those  with a national  benefit  area (Musgrave  1983).
How Albania's  assignments  square  with these  principles  is described  below.
Reonsibilities  for Local Infrastructure Services
36.  Current  thinking  concerning  the allocation  of responsibilities  to local governments  in Albania
seems  to parallel  the assignment  of such  responsibilities  in theory  and in many  market  economies. The
draft  Law  on Asset  Ownershzp  of Local Government  proposes  to transfer  to local  governments  significant
responsibilities  for local  infrastructure, including  facilities  and  equipment  fbr streets and  streetlighting,
water and sewerage systems,  urban transit, firefighting,  garbage collection  and local recreational
and cultural facilities  such  as museums,  sports stadiums and parks.  Local  police  powers  are the only
function  often  undertaken  by local governments  in market economies  that do not appear  to be under
consideration  fDr  transfer  to local  governments  in Albania.  The proposals  also  include  transfer  of all local-20 -
"hardc infrastructure  services  with the  exception  of electricity  reticulation. Most of these services  are
now provided  by stat. enterprises  reporting  to the M7mistry  of Construction.
37.  As  noted above, assigning responsibiity for provision of infstcture  services to  local
government  does  not mean  that  this level of government  has to provide  these services. For instance,  the
central  government  is interested  in privatizing  solid  waste  management  services  even  before  transferring
responsibility  for them to local governments  - including  streetcleaning,  solid waste collection  from
households  and maintenance  of public parks.  These services are presently  provided by  64 state
enerprises.  It is anticipated  that these services  can be provided  by performance  contracting  with the
private sector, as in many  OECD  economies.
38.  Water and Sewerage  Systems. Some  responsibilities  for these functions  have already  been
transferred  to local  governments.  For instance,  there  are 75 water  borne  sewerage  systems  serving  some
30% of the populaon in Albania  and 250 water  systems  serving  80% of the population. The central
government  continues  to maintain  juridiction over all of the 75 sewerage  works  but only 6 water  works
which  rely on the same water source. The remaining  244 water works are the responsibility  of the
municipalities  and  districts  they  serve, in the limited  sense  that these  local governments  are responsible
for paying  for their  operation  and maintenance  costs  from  tariff  revenues. Such  investments  as there  are
in these  water  systems  are  sfill  controlled  centraly, however,  with investment  priorities  being  determined
at the national  level as part of the public  investment  program. This may be all that can  be done for the
time being, but over time, and as fiscal accountability  increases, greater decentralization  will be
appropriate. Furtier, the water tariffs  that local  governments  can charge  are subject  to a price ceaing
set by the central  government  without  regard  to cost differences  between  areas  or any  particular  level  of-21 -
cost recovery. This kind of central  pricing  mandate  prevents  localities  from moving  towards cost
recovery  (section  VI).
39.  Irrigation. The  development  of local  authority  for irrigation  systems  in agriculture  is an example
of the development  of local govenment which is comparable  to the formation  of the many special
purpose  districts  in OECD  countries.  Although  Albania  is  rich in water  supplies,  seasonal  irrigation  and
drainage  are necessary  for adequate  crop growth,  especially  in the country's  fertile coastal  plaiL Some
417,000  hectares,  or roughly  60%  of all arable  land, were serviced  by irrigation  systems  before  1991.
Unfortunately,  this irrigation  system  was one of the principal  pieces  of social capital  which  suffered
extensive  destruction  in  the  jacqueries  accompanying  the fall of  the old communist  regime  in 1991-1992.
Destruction  and theft  was confined  mostly  to the former  cooperative  farms  which  accounted  for 74% of
the total  area  under irrigation,  and extended  from pumping  stations  to high  voltage  electricity  lines  and
even  to the concrete  linings  of irrigation  canals. In addition,  the operation  and maintenance  of the
irrgation  system  was  previously  based  on the old cooperative  and  state  farm.  Privatization  of the latter
posed  institutional  problems  in underting  maintenance  and  collecdng  user fees from the multitude  of
newly-created  small  holdings  - some  400,000  farms  averaging  about 1.4 hectares  have  been  created  as
a resut of priaization by the end  of 1993. These  factors,  along  with  restrctions  on system  maintenance
because  of central  budget  constraints,  reduced  irrigation  to 31%  of the irrigation  "command"  area  in 1992
and  19% in 1993. These  were dramatic  developments  in a poor economy  where  agriculture  is the main
employment  for 50% of the labor  force.
40.  Rehabilitation  of the most cost-effective  parts of the irrigation  system  has accordingly  been  a
priority  for the government  and international  lending  irstitutions. (The  first World  Bank  operation  in-22 -
Albania  - the Critical  Imports  Project  in 1992  - included  an irrigation  component  for the most urgent
repairs  to infstructure and  also  provided  funds  to prepare  a Water  Code  and  legislation  for Water  Users'
Associations).  A proposed  $10 million  Intemational  Development  Association  credit  is presently  being
appraised  by the Bank  for rehabilitation  of irrigation  and drainage  systems  serving  some  57,000 farm
families  in 7 districts  in the coastal  plains.
41.  At present there are 37 district-based  Water Enterprises,  although  it is suggested  that these
Enterprises  might evenually  be merged  into larger organizations  covering  the main river  basins  in the
country.  The Water Enterprises  in turn sell water on a wholesale  basis to emerging  Water Users'
Associations,  which  are based on villages. Although  the irrigation  system was previously  based on
cooperatives  and state  farms whose  boundaries  did not necessarily  coincide  with  those of villages,  after
the pivatization  of agriculture,  the villages  were  found to be the only well-fnctioning  local social  unit
in the countryside.  The Water  Users'  Associations  are comprised  of elected  village  representatives  who
consolidate  water  purchases  from individual  farmers,  collect  water  fees  and enter  into contracts  with  the
Water  Enterprises  for scheduled  deliveries.
42.  Transport  Of the various  means  of transport,  local govenments  have no responsibility  for
mae  transport,  ports and  railroads,  but they  do have  responsibility  for local  roads. Roughly  8,200  km
of the toal naional road network  of 18,000  km. are classified  as "local' roads connecting  small  urban
centers  with  rura communities.  A fur-ther  7,800  km. of "main"  roads  connect  main  cities  with  each  other,
and the 1,800  m. of "economic"  roads serve  industrial  and mining  centers. Excluding  the economic
road  network,  local  roads  constiu  51%  of the road  network  but  are allocated  roughly  30% of total  road
expendiures  in the national  Budget. Owing  to economic  stringency,  most road expenditures  have  been-23 -
restricted  to basic  maintence in recent  years. Recommendations  as to total  expenditures  in the National
Budget,  as well  as the allocation  of expenditures  between  main  and  local  roads,  are  made  by the Nationl
Roads DepartnenL  This Deparment also provides temhnical  assistance  to local governments  and
supervises  road works  that local  govements  undertake.
Responsibilities for Non-Infrastructure  Services
43.  The draft Law on Avset Ownership  of Local Government  also indicates  a willingness  to have  a
considerable  local government  presence  in the delivery  of 'people' services. Social  insurance  (ndUame
econonaike),  is now a centrally  funded  program that is managed  by local goverment  Also under
consideration  is the transfer  w the communes  and  municipalities-  of all facilities  for ldndergarten,primay
and secondwry  schooling  as well as vocational  schools  and schools  for dte hanIcaped.  In the health
sector,  the draft  Law on Asset Ownership  ofLocal Govenmnt proposes  a transfer  of fcities  such as
ambulances,  pediatic dliics, health  centes and  local  clinics  to communes  and  municipalities.  Hospits
and other  healt facilities  would  be devolved  to the district  level  of local goverment  It is recognized,
however,  that efficiency  in the  health  system  could  be improved  through  establisbment  of catchment  areas
for secondary  health  facilities  which  are larger  than  the existing  districts. For this reason, most district
hospitals  are  being  downgraded  so that  they  offer only  the most  basic  inpatient  care while  a smal group
will  be upgraded  to offer  comprehensive  care  to larger  multi-district  catcbment  areas.  Responsibility  for
publc  welfamw  inttutions  such as orphanages  and old-age  homes are covered by the new Socal
AssistanceLaw  (Law  No. 7710, adoptedbytheAlbanianParliamentonMay  18, 1993). Institutions  with
district, commune  or municipal  responsibilities  are trsfered  to those levels of government  while
institutions  dealing  with multiple  districts  are administered  directly  by the M  inistry  of Labor znd  Social-24 -
Protection.  Each  ofthese  assigments of responsibilities  raises  issues  which  are discussedfurtherbelow.
Jaues Raised by Present Expenditure Assignments
44.  Capital  vs. Recurrent  Spending. Some  concerns  about  the proposed  transfers  should  be flagged.
First, it is not clear if operating  responsibiry comparable  to responsibilities  for facilities  will be
transfered to local governments:  the draft  Law  on  Asset  Ownership  of Local Governnent  only  deals  wifth
facilities. It might seem commonsense  that capital  and operating  responsibilities  for these fimutions
should go  together, but no  proposals have yet been made public concerning  future operating
responsibilities  for local  infrastruture. Local  govermnents  should  be assigned  responsibilty  for capital
ependitures in sectors  for which  they also have  recurrent  responsibility.  Substantia problems  would
aise if operating  and  capital  responsibilities  were separated  for the same  finctions.
45.  QuaElty  Standards. Second,  the proposed  trafer  of responsibility  in education  and  health  raise
questions  as to whether  national  sandards will be atained by local governments;  for instance,  in
adherence  to nationl curricula  or in hiring suitably  credentiaIed  teachers  and  medical  personnel. Since
the responsibilities  for health and  education  under consideration  for transfer  to local governments  can
realisdcally  only  be  financed  by  transfers  from  the central  government,  requirements  concerning  stanads
should be a condition of such grants.  The Law on Local Budgets has provisions for such conditional
grants  in its 'constituent budget  section  (see  Section  VI  below).
46.  Maintenance  and  New Investment.  Nor does the draft Law on Asset Ownerslh  of Local
Government  indicate who wil  be responsible for incremental capital expenditures in these areas.  Who-25  -
will build new schools  or new hospitals  or maintain  existing  ones?  If local governments  are to have
responsibilities  for infrastructure,  they  need  to be able  to finance  them. But perhaps  the center  plans  to
retain  this responsibility.  Some  possible  capital  and infrastructure  financing  mechanisms  are outlined  in
section  VI below.
47.  Social Assistance.  Social assistance  in Albania  is  at present centrally  funded but locally
managed,  and  provides  benefits  for families  whose  incomes  fall below  subsistence  levels. The  program
is funded  by a quarterly  grant to communes  and municipalities  from the Ministry  of Labor and Social
Protection. Funds are allocated  on the basis of indicators  of need such as the number  of disabled,  the
number  of unemployed  whose entitlement  to benefits  will expire  in the forthcoming  quarter, etc.
48.  While  the Ministry  of Labor and Social  Protection  determines  these guidelines,  communes  and
muncipalities  themselves  decide  which  families  receive  aid and  how  much  each  family  will geL  Further,
the scheme  is administered  at he local level  by administrators  who  are hired and employed  by the local
governments,  but  have  been  trained  in part by the Mimistry  of Labor and Social  Protection  and are paid
for by the grant  to local governments.
49.  In many  ways, the new  Social  Assistance  Law is a model  for delegation  of responsibilities  and
financing  of functions  from central  to local goverments.  The conditional  gants for this purpose  are
easily  included  in the  constituent"  budgets  of local governments  as specified  in the proposed  Law on
Local Budgets.
50.  Education. As can be seen in Table  4, Education  is presently  the second  most de  a-26  -
ministry after Construction. Only a third of the ministry's  budget  is being supervised  directly  from
Tirana,  while  two-thirds  is managed  by employees  of the Ministry  at the local  level. The draft  Law  on
Asset Ownership  of Local Govermnent  would imply a transfer of responsibility  to the elected  local
governments  for physicalfacilities  in education.
51.  No proposals  have  been  made  public  for comparable  operating  responsibilities  to be transferred
to these  local  governments,  however.  Will  local  governments  be given  full  responsibility  for primary  and
secondary  education? This could  very adversely  affect  educational  quality,  if underfinanced  localities
cannot  afford  to hire qualified  teachers  or maintain  full curricula. It would  certainly  lead  to emerging
differentials  in service  provision unless the center requires standardization  of  teacher quality and
curricula  or other conditions,  as appropriate.
52-  Any  transfer  of educational  responsibilities  to local  governments  should  be financed  by transfers
through  the 'constituent"  sections  of local budgets  (see  Section  VI below). Such  transfers  are strictly
conditional  grants. The Ministry  of Education  should  require  quality  assurances  as conditions  for such
grants-such  as  that  only  nationally  credentialed  teachers  be hired  or that  a national  curriculum  be adhered
to.
53.  Elealth. Health  spending  authority  has also  been  substantially  deconcentrated  in thr past sixty-
one  percent  of the Ministry's  budget  for 1993  being  under  the authority  of Ministry  officials  working  at
the District  level. New  national  health  strategies  currently  being  presented  and  discussed  would  appear
to call  for even  more  emphasis  on such  deconcentrated  management.  The government's  strategy  paper
of April 1993, "A New  Policy  for Health",  calls  for substantial  rationalization  of health  care  delivery,-27  -
including  substantial  reductions  in facilities,  bringing  the remainder  up to a filly operational  state, and
appointment  of District  Health  Directors  who will be responsible  for all public  health  activities  in their
respective  districts.
54.  The proposed  transfer  of capital  responsibilities  in health  to local  governments  in the draft  Law
on Asset  Ownership  of Local  Government  appears  to conflict  with  the emphasis  on deconcentration  in the
emerging  national  health  strategies.  For instance,  as in the case  of education,  it is proposed in the Law
on Asset  Ownership  of Local  Goerment that capital  responsibilities  in health  will  be transferred  to local
govrernments.  If so, who  will cover  recurrent  costs? Again, it would  seem  to be a mistake  to separate
operating  and capital  responsibilities.
55.  As a final  comment,  developments  in the  field  of health  illustrate  that  uncerminty  about  the extent
of deconcentration  and decentralization  poses problems  for planning  by local goverments.  This
uncertainty  is best removed. Further,  quality  control  and coordination  issues  remain.
VI.  REVENUE  ASSIGNMENT  AND  DESIGN-FINANCING
MODALITIES
56.  The key challenge  in financing  local governments  in transition  economies  is to determine  the
actual costs of providing  the services  they are expected  to provide, and design a system for tax
assignments,  shared taxes, transfers  and fees that provide sufficient  revenues  to meet the assigned
expenditures.  General  principles  of financing  local  govermments  are set out in box 4.  Box  5 considers
other sources  of local government  revenues  such as user charges.  Table  5 suggests  possible  financing- 28 -
vehicles  for the various  functions  to be assigned  to local  governments  in Albania.
Jox 4t  Eaudag  Local  Commuat  Taxes  and Tflutem
Where it is impractical to impose fers or le  user charges,  services should be  inRanced principally by
tae  kvied on bha  residents. In many market economies,  local  governments  rely principally  on the property
tax, but revenues can,  in principle, come from many sources, and  there are several modes  for providing local
governmt  wih revenues.  For example,  taxes can be "assigned"  to different  levels  of government  or shared
bdeween  kvels of government. Some  countries  allow "joint"  tax powers  (sharig  the tax base) by alowing  loca
surchares  on federal taxes, such as the personal inome tax.
Redirecfion  of a large share of revenues  to local governments  can restrict the center's macro-eckonic
fexibility, hwever. and eare needs to be taken in decidig which  txes  to assign  to bcal government.  There
are obviou advantages  to assignments  of particour taxe  such as the propery ta  to the excuive use of lcal
govenmet  and "piggybacking'  or surcharge schemes  which  allow  localties to set their own tax rates on tax
bases shared with higher levels  of government Such exclusive  assignment  of tax bases and piggybacking
arrangements  incrae  the accountability  of local  governments  and reader them less  vulnerable  to unilateral
withdrawal  of support from higher level of government.
In most countries, subnational  revenues  are supplemented  by  _asfr,  smnce  the ceal  govement
typicaly takes the highest  yield taxes for itself,  and subnationl governments  are assigned  more exnditure
functions  than can be finnced by their own revenue  sources. In addition,  servic  provided  by local
governments  acting  s the agent of the central government  should be rmanced  by approprie  transfer
paymens from the national  budget
The firt  step in desgning  a  ransfer system  is to detrmine the aggregate  volume  of the transfer; the
second  is to determine  its distribution  across  governments.  Transfers  can be negotiated  on an ad hoc basis or,
preferaly,  set according  t  some dear and agreed criteria -often a formula  is used to provide  budgetary
certainty. This  trafer  formula  wll typically:  0) esfimate  minimum  or "normed"  subnational  expenditure
"needsw  (based  o  assigned  expenditures  and often related to population,  per capita icome, social ndicatrs  or
the actual cst  of delivering  sercs);  and (ii) assess  the blal goveknment  reveues  ("own", assigned  or shared)
available  to finance  these needs. In designg  the transfer, central governments  are often concerned  at local
govenments  "revenue  effort  wil decline  if they become  too dependent  on transfers. Depeding on bow  muc
interegiona  equalization  of expendiures is desiked,  transfers wil fill  all or part of the expenditureirevenme
"gap".
To encourage  or require spending  in speciic areas,  *mah  or conditional  grants may be usedL
Matcbing  grants augment  local  spending  for a spedcic  purpose  by prsbed  amounts of support by higher
levd governments  (e.g., dollar  for dolar).  A problem  with most (but not all) matching  grants is that they may
provie  greater benefts to wealthier  local  governments  that ca- afford greater discreinary  expeditures.
Conditional  grant  are the usual form of support where bigher levels  of government  are ddegat  functions  to
lbwer levels. For istance,  support for health servi  may  be cond;il  on residents  from other locafis
having  access  to treatnent;  support for education  may be condhional  upon adoption  of a prescnrbed
currkula  A blak  grant is a conditional  grant resricted to a specific  set or expenditures,  or one that may be
used for a broad category  of expenditures  and which  has only  gener  conditions  atached.- 29 -
57.  The new  local  financing  system  under  consideration  in Albania  envisages  two  sources  of fiuding:
the taxes  and  fees  that  the local  governments  can  raise  for themselves  (described  in the proposed  changes
to the law on The Tax  System  in Albania),  and ransfers  from the central  government  (described  in the
Law on Local Budgets).
Constituent  and Independent  Local Budgets
58. TheLawonLocalBudgets  envisages  local  budgetary  discretion  in funding  and  providing  some  local
services.  According  to the Law, each local government  will have two parallel budgets.  First, the
consitent  local budgets  will be comprised  of funds from the central government  for "delegateid
programs  supervised  by the central  goverment ministries,  but carried  out at the local level. These  are
stridy  conditional  grant  for performing  specific  functions  and funds are not transferable  between
programs.
59.  The second  component  of local government  budgets  is to be called  the independent  local  budget
section  and fimds  here may be used for any purpose  specified  by local goverments.  Revenues  in the
independent  budgets  are to be derived  from local taxes, fees, income  from revenues  and asset sales of
enterprises  owned by local govenments, and funding  from the budget of the cental government.
Revemnes  in this independent  local budget can be transferred  between  uses.  In effect, the central
government  contribution  to this component  of local government  budgets  amounts  to a  unconditional
block  grant.
60.  The Law on Local  Budgets came  into effect  in December  1993. It represents  an imaginative-30 -
approach  to fmancing  local  governments.  It should  increase  accountability  and  transparency  with respect
to intergovernmental  finmcial  relations  amd  represents  a marked  contrast  with  the individually  negotiated
transfer that were characteristic  of the previous  regime.
Local Own Source Taxes
61.  Most  of te  22 revenue  instruments  now  proposed  for local  governments  in draft  amendments  to
the Law on the Tax  System  in the Republic  of Albania  are  very minor "service  fees". These  are charges
for services  such as fees for registering  mortgages  and other legal documents.  The objective  of these
service  fees is simply  to recover  costs incurred  in their provision;  they are not true general  revenue-
raising  instruments. Albania  has not yet decided  how  much additional  revenue  will be given to local
govements over and  above  that arsing from taxes  assigned  to them  in the draft  law  on taxes. Almost
certainly  the required  revenues  will be substantial  because  the assigned  taxes  will not likely  yield very
much  -in many countries  they  would  be considered  "nuisance  taxes" -complicated  to administer  and
genaering  very little revenue.
62.  Ihe objective  of local autonomy  involves  local governments  having  the  power  to raise  their  own
revenues,  being able to set their own  tax rates and being answerable  to their electors  for these  txing
decisions  and the level of services  they  finance. In this respect,  there is a very positive  feature  of the
draft amendments  to the Law on the Tax System in the Republic of Albania which are being proposed to
accommodate  local  government  taxes. In many  instances,  local  governments  are  given a range  of rates
that can be applied  for a particular  tax.  This element  of discretion  in local setting  of tax rates is to be
welcomed.  Indeed,  as we shall  see  it might  be emiuated  in other areas  where  price  or rate fiing by the- 31 -
central  govenment  considerably  detracts  from local  government  fiscal  flexibility  and  discretion. As we
saw in box 3, there  is wide  agrmet  on te  principles  that  should  determine  the selection  of local  taxes.
Most notably, it is recommended  that local govemment  should levy taxes on inmnobile  bases and
preferably  bases  that reflect  benefits  received  from local  govenmment  services. Other  characteristics  of
a good  local  tax are  that it be visible,  have  a stable and  predictable  yield,  be relatively  easy  to administer
and not be 'exportable"
63.  Property Taxes. Most of these criteria  of a good  local tax support  the use of a ax on
immobile  property  and there is also considerable  intuitive  appeal  to the use of property  taxes.  Local
property  values  are closely  linked  to the extent  of the infrastructure  services  that support  them, such as
street construction,  maintenance  and lighting.  Property taxes are therefore attractive  on "benefit"
-S.
64.  The use of  property  taxes  is widespread.  Out  of 24 OECD  coutries for which  data  are available,
for instance,  20 levy some  form of property  taxation. Property  taxation  has been a mainstay  of local
governments  in English-speaking  countries,  but is not restricted  to them. The property  tax is the main
source of local govenment taxation in Holand, and bas also been introduced  in recent years in
Mediterranean  countries  such  as Portugal,  Spain  and  Italy. The case  of Italy  is perhaps  most interesting,
because  it is Albania's  neighbor  and the principal  national  donor of aid to Albania. It has long been
recognized  in Italy that the country's  local governments  have  been overly  dependent  on transfers  and
need  to acquire  their own sources  of revenues  to increase  their autonomy. A national  property  tax has
been introduced  in  taly  and is to become  a local  property  tax with locally  established  rates  in 1994.-32 -
65.  In dhes. circumstances,  it is natural that the govenment of Albania has been interested  in
introdudng  a property  tax , primarily  to support  local  government.  The government  has sought  advice
from  the U.S. Treasury  and  tho  Harvard  Instituto  for International  Development  onto  formation  of such
a ta7  Some  preliminaw  steps would  be necessary  to implement  a conventional  property  tax, including
the introduction  of a cadastre,  or land  ownership  register. The government  has not, however,  been  able
to auract  the interonal  assistance  necessary  to introduce  such  a full-blown  property  tax and  has  decided
to introduce  a more limited  version. The Property  Tax  Law passed  in mid-March  1994  requires  the
central  government  to undertake  property  valuation,  to set  the rates  and  to administer  the  tax,  but for 60%
of the revenues  to be distributed  to local  governments  according  to the source  of the revenues.  In rural
areas,  the tax  would  be assessed  on the  ferdlity  of land,  like  toe  presumptive  taxes  assessed  on agriculture
in many developing  countries. In urban areas, the tax would be restricted  initially  to the value of
buildings.
66.  Some  comments  on the  proposed  Albanian  property  tax are called  for. First, there is little sense
in which  toe tax is now  a local  property  tax, since  neither  the assessments  of property  values,  nor the tax
rates  nor the adminitration of toe tax are to be performed  by local government. The assessment  of
property  tax values  and  perhaps  even  administration  of the tax are not essential  to its character  as a local
tax.  Higher  levels of govermment  commonly  intervene  in or even determine  assessments  of property
values  in many counties for various  reasons. One  reason  that might alone  justify central  government
detmination of assessments  in Albania  would  be to have  comparable  property  values  for calculation  of
equalization  of local  government  fiscal capacities.
67.  The freedom  of local  governments  to set local  tax  rates  is, however,  essential  to the  property  tax-33  -
being a true local tax.  If local governments  do not determine  the tax rates, the proper"t tax is merely
another  source  of revenue  to local governments  and does  not contribute  to their accountability  to local
taxpayers  nor to their autonomy.
Equafzatlon
68.  Property  taxes  will obviously  yield  greater  revenues  to some  municipalities  and  communes  than
others. Not  all municipalities  wilL  have as  valuable  a property  tax base as Tirana, where  rents of $1,000
a month were paid for prime retail locations  in early 1993  at a time when anmual  GDP per capita  was
much  less  than  $300. Equally,  communes  with prime  agricultural  land  will obtain  greater  revenues  than
others from the property tax.  "Equalization"  grants from the central  to local governments  may be
desirable  to assist local governments  with such lower  yielding  tax bases.
69.  Many industrial  states such as Canada  and Germany  and some developing  countries  such as
Morocco  have the goal of equalizing  revenues  of subnational  governents.  The objective  of these
revenue  equalizaion  programs  is not to provide  some  form  of guaranteed  income  for local governments
but to attain  goals  which  directly  benefit  indiviual  citizens-goals  such as treating  citizens  equitably  no
mar  where  they  live in the country  and increasing  efficiency  in the allocation  of resources  and  hence
the standard  of living. The equity  goal is an adaptation  of the rule that likes should  be treated  alike by
government In a regional  context,  this means  that individuals  who  are equally  well-off  should  be treated
the same  no matter  where  they  reside in Albania.
70.  Equalization  is necessary  to attain  these  equity  and  efficiency  goals  because  the 'fiscal  capacities"-34-
of local goverments differ. Thus, the fact that  rental values  are higher in Tirana  than in less well-off
localities  would  be reflected  in higher per capita  realizations  of a property  tax levied at the same rates
throughout  Albania. The result would  be the residents  of Tirana  would  benefit  from greater "net fiscal
benefits"  because  the city  would  be able  to finance  its municipal  services  with  less fiscal  effort  than  ocher
cities.
71.  Equalization  compensates  for such  difference  in fiscal capacities  between  local governments  by
redistruting  income  to the less  well-off  local govermments.  Not only  will this increase  equity  but it will
also efficiency  in the allocation  of resources. Without  equalization,  people  will eventually  migrate  to
capre  such net fiscal  benefits and such migration  is inefficient. To attain efficiency  in the allocation
of resources,  the  productivity  of workers  (and  for that matter,  capital),  has to be the same  in all areas  of
the country. Otherwise,  national  output could  be increased  by moving  labor and capital  around until
producdviy is equalized.  Ths  is exactly what normal migration  to get better jobs achieves, but
productivity is not increased if  migration occurs to  capture the fiscal benefits descnbed above.
Equalization  payments  to local governments  with below-average  fiscal capacities  will allow them tD
increase  their services  or lower  their tax rates. This will, in turn, reduce  fiscally-induced  migration.
Other  Possible  Local  Taxes
72.  Local  income  taxes  are the principal  source  of tax revemne  in about  half of the OECD  countries.
They are particularly  important  in the Scandinavian  countries  (Sweden,  Denmark  and Norway),  where
local  govemments  have  been  assigned  significant  roles in the delivery  of the 'people" services  of health,
education  and social welfare services and are, as a result, relatively large in  relation to  central-35 -
governments. The local governments  in these Scandinavian  countries  determine  their own tax rates as
a share  of the national  government's  income  tax base. 'The  larger subnational  governments  in some  odter
countries,  such as the provinces  in Canada, also apply surcharges  on income  tax bases determined  by
central  governments. In the opinion  of many experts,  such surcharges  or piggy-backing  arragements
should  be used more widely, since they preserve  a common  tax base, maintain  the autonomy  of local
governments  and make them accountable  to local  taxpayers.
73.  It is generally  agreed,  however,  that piggy-backing  by subnational  governments  on a multilvel
consumption  tax such as the VAT  would  be very difficult  if not impossible.  Albania's  proposed  reliance
on a value-added  tax as the principal national source of tax revenue, as well as the prospective
unimportance of income taxes for the immediate future, suggest that local governmet  surcharges on a
central  government  tax base are therefore  not a practical  possibility  in Albania
Business Taxes
74.  There is also general  agreement  that local governments  should  be restricted  from tapping  some
forms of revenue in order to  perform  their important  role in efficient  allocation  of resources.  The
principles  that should be observed  are that local government  taxes should not distort the location  of
factors  and that local governments  should  not have  a claim  on taxes  generated  in their localities  that arm
borne  by nonresidents. Natural  resource  revenues  are a case  in point  that are of some  significance,  given
that  Albania  is one of the largest  producers  of chromium  in the world  and is an exporter of other  minerls
as well. Higher  property  tax rates for businesses  than housing  which  are not  justified  by differences  in
service  levels are another  example,' as are sales taxes applied  at other  than.  the retail  level such as the-36 -
present  turnover  tax in Albania.
75.  While  it may  be attractive  for local  politicians  to try to shift  the burden  of taxes  to nonresidents,
such tax exporting  artificially  cheapens  and inflates  local provision  of services  and thereby  erodes  dte
efficiency  benefits contributed  by  local governments.  To prevent  the "exporting"  of such taxes to
nonresidents,  the central  government  should  restrict their use by local goverment.
76.  Business  taxes used to raise revenues  (and not charge  for services rendered)  are considered
undesirable  for the above  reasons. Business  taxes in France  and Canada  are cases  in point. The tar.e
professionelle  raises 40% of local taxes in France  and it is estimated  that from 42% to 739%  of this tax
is exported  beyond  the taxing  locality.9 Business  taxes account  for about  one- tenth of local taxes in
Canada  and  it is estimated  that from 16%  to 100%  of such nonresidential  local taxes are exported  from
the locality  levying  the  tax.
Revenue Sufffriency
77.  What other revenue  options  are there? The center  could  simply  share some  of the revenues  it
collects with local goverments. Simple  revenue-sharing  according  to the area of origin of central
goverment taes  - the "derivation"  prnciple - could  be problematical,  however, since it could  be
severely  "counter-  equalizing".  As shown  in Table  6, most  revenues  are collected  in only a few  districts
-Tirana and  Durres collect  almost  50% of all revenues,  but have  less thm 20% of Albania's  populaon.
Thus, the simplest  scheme  of sharing revenues  according  to the district of their origin (or collection)
would  not be adequate  to support  main  e of national  standards  in services  such as health,  education- 37 -
and social assistance. Put another  way, the poorer districts  would  not be able  to provide  adequate  levds
of services,  including  those  that are commonly  thought  to have  large  spill-overs, if central  revenues  were
shared  by district of origin. Revenue-sharing  also suffers  from other  problems, in that it decreases  the
acoountability  of local governments.  As U.S. experience  under  the Reagan  administration  also indicates,
revenue-sharing  can be altered  unilaterally  by higher level govemments  and consequently  decreases  the
autonomy  of local governments.  Some othrr sharing basis than this derivation  principle,  probably a
formula  based  on expenditure  needs  andlor other indicators, would  be appropriate  (see Section  VI).
78.  Lecal vehicle taxes could also be used with profit in Albania. Private ownership  of
automobiles  was banned  in Albania  until early 1991, but there is evidence  of impressive  growth  in their
ownership  since then - and in the private and social costs of such growth.  For instne,  in 1993
Albania  had the highest  road accident  rate in Europe, leading  to a death  rate per vehicle-kilometer  about
20 times that in Italy. A local tax on moveable  property  - automobiles  and other vehicles  - would  be
a useful proxy for a tax on local road use.  Those fortunate  enough  to own cars in Albania  are much
beter off than  the rest of the population  and can  well afford  to pay this and other  taxes  on road use (such
as import duties for automobiles,  licensing  fees and excise  taxes on automotive  fuels imposed  by the
central  govemment.)
User Charges,  Local Pricing Discretion  and  Central  Prieing Mandates
79.  In additionto  revenues  from  taxes  (for  the independent  budgets),  and  block  grants  (for consotent
budgets), local governments  in Albania  also derive income  from enterprises  dat now fall or wil fall
under their responsibility,  including  local uiities.  At present, the central goverment maintain-38 -
jurisdiction  over all 75 of the water  borne  sewerage  works  and for 6 of the nation's 250 water  systems.
Sewerage  service,  where  provided,  is at  no charge  to the consumer  with costs  of provision  being  assumed
in the national  budget. In the case  of the water  works, invesunent  priorities,  funding  for investment  and
prices or tariffs  to consumers  for all 250 systems  have  been set by the central  government. The local
governnents  which  have responsibility  for  operation  and maintenance  of 244 of the water systems  are
expected  to finance  the service  with revenues  from  tariffs. However,  the tariff  has been set  by the central
government  at a uniform  nation-wide  level  that ignores  local  cost differences  in supply  of these  serices
and  has not covered  operating  and maintenance  costs  except  for a few works. Not  unnaturally,  the result
has been  a lack  of comnitnent to the service  by the local  authorities  and  deferred  maintenance.  Further,
customers  are billed  at a flat rate that gives  them no incentive  to conserve.  Local  authority  to set tariffs
and an appropriate  pricing  policy  is essential  to improve  service  and  promote  fiul cost recovery  for these
utilities.
s0.  Conceming  irrigation pricing  in agriculture,  Albania  is credited  by intemational  specialists
with  having  established  a simple  and  effective  user-pay  system  which  could  provide  efficient  water  pricing
on a per-unit  basis. Current  pricing levels,  however,  are insufficient  to  oDver  overall costs of system
operation  and  maintenance  and  to pay  for investments  required  for system  rehabilitation.  In addition,  and
as for other utilities,  fees are centrally  fixed and  do not make allowance  for different  levels of costs  for
providing  water or artificial  drainage  in different  areas.  It will therefore  be necessary  to revise  the
curent level of water charges  to attain  full cost recovery  and reflect actual  district-based  expenditures
incurred  by the respective  Water  Enterprises  and allow  greater  local  pricing  discretion  and  cost  recovery.
In these and other examples  of utility pricing, an appropriate  role for the central  govemment  would  be
to set framework  policies  to guide local tariff determination  and to abstain  from micromana 6cment of- 39 -
local utility  pricing.
Box 5: User Charges and Fees as "Own Source" Reveaue for Local Govemments
The  principal  "own  source"revenues  of local  governments,  or revenues  dtat  they  themselves  levy,  are fees  or charges
and taxes.  The distinction  between  the two revenue  categories  is that  taxes  are compulsory  paymens for public
services  which  do not vary  with  the level  of consumption  of specific  goods  and services,  whereas  charges  and fees
are collected  from the recipients  of specific  services  and  often  vary with  the extent  of consumption  of the service.
Charges  and fees  dierefore  represent  a specific  attempt  to link  the benefits  and costs  of local  government  servics and
are often  referred  to as user fees.
Three ypes of fees or charges  have  been distinguished:  public  prices, specific  benefit  charges  and service  fees.3
Public prices  consist  of direct charges  for services  consumed,  suc.l  as bus fares or public  utility  rates for water
reticulation  or entrance  fees  for  public  recreational  facilities  such  as swinuning  pools. Specific  benefit  charges  charges
are more  indirect  in nature,  such as "development  charges"  or 'local improvement  charges"  levied  to cover the  costs
of local improvements  such as sewer  extension,  streeghdighting  or other  infrasmuctre  costs associated  with  the
development  of new  housing  subdivisions  or estates. Finally,  service  fees  are chages for bureaucratic  services  such
as provision  of marriage  licences  or other mnandatory  legal  documents.
ft is not often appreciated  how important user fees and charges  are as a source  of lcal  government  revenue  in
developed  countries. For instance,  they  account  for as much of 40% of revenues  raised by local taxes  in OECD
counties.  The feeling  thatbeneficiaries  of many  local  government  services  should  pay  their own  way is also  strong
in some  countries. Thus,  the U.S. Advisory  Committee  on Intergovernmenta  Relations  has  found  that  Ameria
express  a strong  preference  for user charges  as opposed  to odier  means  of raising  government  revenues. 5
Many  experts  think  dat even  more  use might  be made  of user fees  than  at present  by local  governments;  their motto
is 'wherever  possible,  charge'.'  The  case for  using  user charges  to  pay  for services  is in fact  an impornt corolary
of the principal  rationale  for local  government,  which is its efficiency  role.  As in private  muakets,  users of local
govennment  services  have  the choice  of buying  or not buying  services  and  their actions  indicate  whether  provision  of
services  is efficient fees cover costs  of provision.
It is also relevant  to consider  the conditions  under which  the use of fees and charges  are inappropriae.  First,
distributional  effects  should  not be important  considerations  where  user  fees  are contemplated;  here there  is a feeling
that beneficiaries  should not be required  to pay their own way.  In addition, it must be possible  to identify
beneficiaries  so that  those  who are not willing  to pay for the service  can be excluded. Nor should  externlities  be
significant Thus, local government  health  clinics  in OECD  countries  often choose  not to impose  user fees for
immunizaton  against  contagious  diseases,  for example.
We conclude  that  there  is a strong  case  for user  fees  as a principal  source  of local  government  revenue  and we  suggest
hat more  use might  be made  in Albania  of such  fees.-40 -
A Smaller Role for Social Pricing?
81.  As is well-known,  the former command  economies  used pricing policies as a tool for
redistnrbuting  income. Albania  provides  a number  of examples  of pricing  policies,  often  involving  local
utilities  or affecting  local goverments, that have been apparently  undertaken  either for distributional
reasons  or in the belief  that price ceilings  imposed  would  contribute  to macroeconomic  stability. What
is interesting  is that such policies  often  have perverse  or questionable  distributional  effects. The cross-
subsidies  involved  in the present  uniform  national  pricing  policy  for water services  to households  are a
case  in point,  since  costs  of supply  vary by locality  in a way  that is not obviously  correlated  with the  need
for income  support. Nor is it obvious  why  the 30% of the population  which  receives  sewerage  services
at no cost are more deserving  than  those  who  receive  no government-provided  sanitation  service  at all.
82.  There are, in fact, more obvious examples  of mischievous  effects  of misguided  pricing
policies  for i  ructure  and other  utilities  than  those  mentioned.  For instance,  automobile  owners  are
among  the better  off in Albania,  and  until recently  tbey have  also  benefited  from subsidized  fuel prices.
These subsidies,  indeed,  were large enough  so that foreiga vehicles  entered  Albania to buy fael.  In
addition,  large  numbers  of electric  appliances  have  been  imported  into  Albania  in 1992-1994  by its more
fortunate  cifizens,  who  have  also  benefited  by the fact  that  electricity  has also  been  supplied  to households
at one-tenth  of its cost of production.
83.  Indeed,  underpricing  (or cross-subsidizing)  local services  rarely leads  to the desired  resut
of helping  the poor more than  those  with higher incomes. Consumption  of most goods  normaly rises
with income,  and  subsidies  for these "normal"  goods  therefore  give  the least  help  to the poorest In fact,- 41 -
it is now a common  finding  that subsidies  for infrastructure  benefit  the  better off much  more than  those
with lower incomes.  This finding  is frequently  trumpeted  with respect  to subsidies  for electricity, but
appears  also to apply  even  to household  water supply  and sewerage  systems." The point is simply  that
the poorest often do not have access to these services. Such subsidies  and cross-subsidies  also violate
principles  of good governance  in that they  are not transparent  and  their effects,  as we have  seen, may  not
be self-evident.  In Albania,  it is almost  certainly  the case  with respect  to cross-subsidies  that as "in  most
countries,  more efficient  and effective  instruments  should  be used to help the poor. 'I
84.  These policies  with respect  to subsidies  and cross-subsidies  are now changing. For some
of the fuels mentioned  above, the government  has moved  to adopt market prices and for others prices
close  to cost recovery  levels  have  been imposed. Thus, automotive  fuel prices were raised to European
levels in  1993.  Most recently, in a decision of 31 March, 1994, the government  raised tariffs for
household  electricity  usage sixfold,  raised kerosene  prices fourfold  and raised  tariffs for gas and steam
heating  four- to sixfold. Prices for wood and coal  for heating were freed to find their market  levels.
85.  The government  has followed  an interesting  strategy in raising some of these prices, by
adjusting  public sector wages  and transfers  to households  to compensate  for overall loss of purchasing
power. While  this strategy does leave  the newly emerging  private sector  to fend for itself (as perhaps
it should), it affects  just over half of total budget expenditures.? This strategy was first adopted in
raising  the price of bread, and its success  appears  to have convinced  the government  to move towards
market prices for many other goods that have a less dramatic  impact  on consumer  budgets. Another
apparent motive in raising these prices is to get them to  cost recovery levels so that the services
concerned  can then  be successfully  privatized. In this connection,  it is of interest  that the government- 42 -
has expressed  an interest in privatizing  services  such  as solid waste  collection  and streetcleaning  which
are presently  provided  by state enterprises  reporting  to the Ministry  of Construction.
VII.  TRANSFERS,  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  GRANTS AND OTHER
SOURCES  OF  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  FINANCE
Transfers
86.  Finally,  the  precise  nature  of central  govermment  transfers  to the  constituent  and  independent
local  budgets  are not fully spelled  out in the Law  on Local  Budgets. Ideally,  these  should  be determined
in a transparent  fashion and be stable and predictable  over time.  The 'negotiated  or  'bargained
transfers  between  levels of govermnent  typical  of the old command  econmy are  not compatible  with
local autonomy  and accountability.  In addition,  the transfer  system  should  provide  for some  equalization.
It is likely that local govemnments  in Albania will be highly "transfer dependent  for a long time.  The
design  of these transfers  is thus an important  consideration.
87.  The government  of Albania  could  perform  an equalization  function  when it provides,  as is
planned,  some  unconditional  tansfers to local  govemmes.  Equalizaon of per capita  revemne  capacities
of local governments  might  be adopted  as an explicit  objective  of central  govermnent  contributions  to the
"independent"  sections  of these  local  budgets. The extent  to which  the transfers  to 'constituent  budgets"
are equalizing  will  depend  on how  the underlying  central  services  (education,  health,  etc.) are themselves
distributed.-43  -
Ptlvatization  Revenues
88.  Local  governments  in Albania  have  recendy  been  given  control  of some  small and  medium
enterprises. Given  the inadequacy  of other revenue  sources  to local governments  in many countries  in
transition,  local governments  may  be temptez  to augment  their small  revenues  by extracting  monopoly
rents from enterprises  under their direct control  and by becoming entrepreneurial"  with their newly
acquired  assets.
89.  Albania  appears  to have  found  the means  to avoid  this problem  in Decree  No. 248 of 1993
onMeasuresjbr  theAcceleration  of Pnvatization  of Small  andMedium  Enterprises.  All  of the properties
concerned  are to be sold by public  auction within a relatively  short time period, and there is some
evidence  that the small  and medium  private  enterprises  that are the subject  of Decree  No. 248 appear  to
be moving  expeditiously  into private  hands. The decree also specifies  that local governments  are to
receive  28 percent  of the net proceeds  of privatization  of small and medium  enterprises.
90.  More generaRy,  it is important  to ensure  that local  governments  have  adequate  revenues  to
fiance their finctions,  so that  they  do not see  enterprise  ownership  as a necessary  source  of finance,  as
has happened  in many other transition economies. 'Enterpreneurialism"  in local government  and
ownership  of enterprises  by local government  is not to be encouraged.
Local Government Borrowin?
91.  The Lawfor Local  Budgets  (Article  6c) indicates  that  local governments  can only borrow-44 -
for investment. This is fully appropriate.  Investment  in infrastructure  such as local road construction
or sewer extensions  leads  to future  benefits  and is most appropriately  financed  by long-term  borrowing.
It would  obviously  not be desirable  to require  that these investnents  be financed  out of current  local
government  revenues.
92.  Albania  has greater needs  for rehabilitation  and replacement  of public  sector capital  than
most of the economies  in transition. Recall  that in the breakdown  of public  order  accompanying  the fall
of the old regime  in 1991-92,  more than  a third of the schools  and roughly  a quarter  of all local health
centers  were either  badly damaged  or destroyed. If responsibility  for many  of these public facilities  is
to be devolved  to local goverunents, as is proposed, some method of long-tem  financing for construcdon
and repair of these structures will have  to be devised.
93.  The development  of capital  markets  in Albania  will satisfy  these  local  government  borrowing
needs  only in the long run.  In the short run, much capital  expenditure  on local infastructure is being
finaced by foreig  grants  or loans  at concessional  terms. 1' In the transition  period,  however,  alteative
arrangements  need to be developed  to permit capital  expenditures  to be financed-by central  or local
g,overnments  or their utilities. Other countries  that have  faced thin or nonexistent  capital  markt  for
local infrastructure  have dealt with  this problem  (or are proposing  to deal  with it) by creating  municipal
credit agencies  for local governments. In these arrangements,  loans  are supposed  to be made only to
creditworthy  local  governments:  creditworthiness  being  assessed  on the basis of plans  for cost-recovery
or on the promise  of future streams  of transfer  payments  from central  governments. Loans  are usually
for capital  spending  on  health, education,  utilities  and  transport  and are  not extended  for capital  formation
in other  commercial  enterprises  that may  be owned  by municipalities.-45  -
94.  Experience  in the establishment  of such municipal  credit agencies  has frequently  been
disappointing.U  Accordingly,  direct involvement  by the Ministry  of Finance and Economy  may be
necessary  both in approving  and supplying  funds  for local  govemment  capital  projects  in the near  fiuture
in Albania,  in the context  of a formal  public  investment  program  that includes  local investmens.
VIII.  THE CONTINUING  PROCESS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
95.  The process of managing  intergovemrmental  relations will not cease after the present
legislation  has been  adopted  and implemented.  There will be a continuing  need  to perfrm technical  and
nonlpolitical  functions  concerming  intergovernmental  relations  in the Government  of Albania. Because  of
the role currently  being  played  by the Council  of Ministers  coupled  with  the short term desire  to limit
bureaucracy,  this is likely  to be an effective  location  for an intergovernmentaO  coordinationfnction.
96.  An important role for such a coordinatdng  body arses from the fact that ceral  government
contributions  to each  local government  budget  are to be presented  for approval  to Parliament  each  year
under the Lawfor Local  Budgets. The intergovernmental  coordinating  body might  be given  the task of
analyzing  local  goverment submissions  and  preparing  recommendations  on these  budgets.  Parliamentary
deliberations  might also benefit  from preparation  of an annual  report  to Parliament  by the Mbinier for
Local Governments,  which  would  be prepared  by the coordinating  body. Such a report would  present
social, economic  and financial  data relating  to the revenues  and responsibilities  of local governments.-46 -
97.  Finally, the body might provide  technical  assistance  for local govenment  to build up
financial  and other  management  skills. The body might  also assist  local  governments  in making  formal
cooperative  arrangements  where  they have common  interests,  such as to provide services  where cost
savings  are possible  or, to give  an actual  example,  6 local govermments  obtain  their water  supplies  from
a common  source. On the other  hand, the suggested  body could  also play  the role of an arbiter  where
the interests  of local governments  conflict.
IX.  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
98.  Several  conclusions  emerge  from this examination  of decentralation initiatives  in Albania.
Albania's  small size is obviously  one of the factors  that must  be taken  into account  in assessing  present
proposals  for and  progress  in decentralization.  Functions  that  might  be undertaken  by local governments
in other  countries  may  well  be appropriate  for the central  government  in Albania.  But  while  Albania  may
be small,  this does  not detract  from  the traditional  economic  argument  for local government  where  public
services  are of purely  local interest  and  their benefits  are confined  to restricted  geographic  areas. The
central  government  of Albania  should  not be responsible  for  activities  such as  local rat catching  or
filling  in potholes  in village  streets. These  tasks can  be left  to local  governments  so that the government
of Albania  can devote  itself  to appropriate  national  concerns  such as defence.
99.  The wisdom  of decentralizing  non-infrastructure  "social"  services  such  as education  or  health
is another  mattr.  What may  distinguish  Albania  from other  former  command  economies,  however,  is
the ferocity  with  which  the population  detested  the  former  highly  centralized  communist  regime,  and  this
may  account  for some  of the fervor  with  which  the  prospect  of decentralized  govaernment  is viewed. This-47  -
baclkground  needs to be taken into account  when one wonders whether Albania can "afford' some
decentadiation in provision,  for instance,  of services  such  as education.  The severe  damage  or outright
destruction  of a third of the schools  and a quarter of all local health centers  which accompanied  the
demise  of the old  regime  is a very good  argument  for attempting  to get local communities  more  Involved
in the operation  of these facilities  and in giving the communities  somei  sense of ownership  of those
facilities. As is well-known  in OECD  states, local  governments  are usually  willing  to contribute  to  the
financing  of facilities such as local schools, even if provision of this and similar 'people" services is the
primary responsibility  of higher levels of government. Of course, central quality control fthough
conditionality  of transfers  remains  appropriate  to ensure  service  provision  levels  do not diverge across
localities  in these key sectors.
100.  Indeed, Albania's  experiences  under  the Hoxha  regime  provide  many  good illustrations  of
the validity  of arguments  for decentralized  management  of the economic  system. Ihey  also serve  as a
potent  reminder  that externality  arguments  for involving  higher levels  of government  do not mean that
functions  can be safely  left to the latter and are not a magic  wand that will make problems  go away.
lTus,  the citizens  of Albania's  second  largest  city, Dunres,  who  have  had to suffer  through  four typhoid
epidemics  in the last ten years because  of contamination  of the water supply fuimished  by the central
government,  can attest to the fact that central  provision  of services  does not necessarily  take care of
eternalities.  Of course,  for efficient  local  provision,  adequate  revenue  efforts, appropriate  pricing, and
a well-designed  transfer  system  will be needed  - each  of which  will take major efforts.
101.  Lack of clarity in draft legislation  with respect to responsibility  of the two levels of
government for major functions -particularly  for health and education -remains  a  concern.-48  -
Accountability  requires  clear lines of responsibility. The draft  Law on Asset Ownership  of Local
Gowrnament  does not indicate  which  level of government  would  be responsible  for incremental  capital
costs  and recurrent  costs  in education  and health. There is already  an example  of the consequences  of
such  muddied  lines  oZ  responsibility  in the  provision  of city  water  supplies  where  the local  authorities  are
responsible  for operations  and  maintenance  and  the central  authorities  are responsible  for investment  and
set water  rates  or tariffs  for users. The latter  have  frequently  not been  sufficient  to cover  operating  and
maintenance  costs. The result  has been  a lack of commitnent  by the local authorities  to provision  of
water service, deferred  maintenance  and underinvestment.  One should  likewise  be concerned  what
continued  uncertainty  about  the possible  extent  of fiscal  and administrative  decentralization  in Albania
poses  problems  for forward  planning  in many  fields  such  as health. This  uncertainty  is best removed  as
expeditiously  as possible.
102.  As regards the organization  of governmental  serrices,  the appropriate  spatial  units for
decentralization  and  deconcentration  need  not  be regarded  as fixed  in stone  and need  not coincide  with
the present  structure  of local government.  The creation  of 11 new  disticts since  1991  appears  to have
been a resonse to political  pressures  from local  interests  who  thought  their constituencies  were being
ignored. It would  be.somewhat  surprising  if the  results  of such  redistricting  coincided  with  the optima
size of units  for many  administrative  purposes  and,  in any event,  the size  of the latter  may  wetl  fluctuate
over time. For many  functions,  what  may  be needed  is the equivalent  of the "special  purpose"  districts
that have been created  in many OECD-  states.  For instance,  appropriate  "hydraulic"  units for the
irrigation  network  in agriculture  would  be more  logically  based  on the main  river  basins  in Albania  than
on the existing  37 districts. Such a reorganization  of  areas for irrigation  provision  would be quite
compatible  with decentralized  responsibility  for demand  management  among  users' associations  of.49  -
farum . Similarly,  the Ministry  of Halth is  presendy  considering  the creation  of  what  are in effect
'fil-service' hospitals  for catchment  - that exceed  the size  of present  disricts and limiting  the
services  prvided in existing  district  hospitals.
103.  Tuming  to the  inancing  of local  gowvem  senrice, the traditional  sources  of "own"
revenues  of local goverments  in many  OECD  counties  are user  fees  and  property  taxes  and  both  can
be  applied  in Albania.  AlbaniaWs  determination  to install  a propety  tax  with  most  revenues  from  the  tax
being  assigned  to nUmicipalities  is noteworthy  in this regard. Whie central  govenment administation
of  assessment  is acceptable  and  even  recommended  for  pupose of establishing  qalizaion paymens,
local  freedom  to set  property  tax rates  is an essential  ftre  of eventual  local  goverment  autonomy.
104.  Winh  respect  toforfr  dth servies  of  locuSalldes,  it would  be best  tD avoid  using  pricing
or tariff-sting as a means  of income  r  ition  as appear  to have  been  the objective  in the  past
Holdinlgto the exitig  patter of utiity prices  with  the go- of restaining inlation is also a quesdonable
use  of  public  policy.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the  beter off  have  benefed  di  rI  ly  from  some
of these  policies  in Albania,  whether  they have  involved  subsidies  for automtve fuel  or household
electricity,  the prwvision  withwut  chrge of sewerage  services  to the 30%  of  Albanan who  can  benefit
from  this  service,  or to the  80%  of  tbe  popuation  who  are  provided  with  household  water  supplies.  The
goverment  has already  increased  automotive  fuel  prices  to European  levels  and on March  31 1994
insed  household  elericity prices  roughly  sixfold. Sewer  and water  chages should  similarly  be
moved  to levels  which  permit  fll  cost  recovery  as soon  as possible.
1OS.  The  past  and  present  practice  of  imposing  unforn natonwideprices  for  local  utilities  also-50  -
Involves  cross-subsidies  of dubious  distributional  merit. More  particularly,  however,  in fields  such  as
household  water  reticulation  and  irrigation  in agriculture  it ignores  underlying  cost  differences  between
locations which  are appropriately  reflected  in prices. The practice  of pricing  below  cost  :rcovery  levels
is a hangover  from central  planning and the antithesis  of the decentralized  management  that many  of
these services  need.  There are many instances  in both infrastructure  and 'people" services  where
efficiency  and  responsiveness  to demand  could  be inproved through  decentralized  or deconcentrated  but
in any event more autonomous  management.  Much effort is now being devoted  to building  up such
decentralized  and deconcentrated  management  capacity  in particular  areas so that it can better  respond
to the need  of local  populations.  Ihis, for instance,  is a principal  thrust  of the National  Primary  Health
Care  Plan that  the Ministry  of Health  has drafted.
106.  The practice  of imposing  unifb  %n  national  prices  for local  public  utilities, even  where  local
costs of supply  differ, may  be a throwback  to old habits  of highly  centralized  government.  Similirly,
we noted  that the property  tax, which  is to be the principal  revenue  source  for local govermnent,  will
have rates specified  by  the central government.  We recognized,  however, that although local
governments  have  been  given  some  flexibility  in choosing  rates  for other local  taxes. A desire  for local
government  may  be meaningless  if ftis level  of government  is not given  sufficient  power  to raise  its own
revenues,  set its own tax and user fee levels and be responsible  to its own electors  for these taxing
decisions  and  the level  of services  it provides.  At some  point,  local  government  in Albania  means  cutting
the apron  strings  to Tirna.
107.  Finally, whether  government  is moving  towards  greater  decentralization  or deconcentration
of programs,  it is dear that oentral  budget  tranfers will remain the dominant  source of financing  for- 51 -
many  of these functions  for the foreseeable  future. It is quite  feasible  for some  of these  services  to be
delivered  by local governments  but for central  government  interests  in having national  stadards  in
provision  of these  services  to be attained  by appropriate  design  of conditional  grants  or transfer  payments.
The accountability  of both local  and  central  governments  will  be enhanced  by such  transparent  transfers,
as opposed to the individually  negotiated  transfers that have been common in the past.  In the
"constituent"  and "local"  budgets  adopted  under the Law on Local  Budgets, Albania  hds developed  a
novel intergovemnmental  financing  vehicle which increases  transparency  of and accountability  for
intergovernmental  fiscal flows  and which  should  be of some interest  in the rest of the world. Finaly,
if more reliance  is to be placed on local  "own"  revenue  sources  for local governments,  we noted  the
need  for consideration of "equaization" payments to those local governments ta  will inevitably have
lesser  fiscal capacity  per capita.
108.  Albania  took  a radical  step  away  from the  past and  towards  joining  the family  of democraic
nations  when  it introduced  elected  local  governments  in July of 1992. The promise  of better  governance
associated  with autonomous  la  governments  which  are  responsive  and  responsible  to local electorates
for the pricing and provision  of local services  still lies largely  ahead. Despite  the difficult  conditions
associated  wii  the birth of one of the world's newest  democracies,  however,  there is little doubt  that
Albania  is on the pat  to this goal.- " *1  -
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__._._._:_.._._._:_._Xter  Eu  ron  Earapean  Countries  and Albaiza .
Size  of Local  Government  Urbanii
Typo  of Loc¢al  Average  Range  Percent  of
Country  Government  Name  Number  Pbpulation  minumum  maximum  Population  Living
in  Urban  Areas
(Towns  >
10,000)  21
Albania  Districts  rethe  37  96,118  23,800  414,350  35
Municipalitia/  baXshki/comuna  352  6,936  1,300  270,000
Communes
Bulgaria  Countica  oblast  9  941,413  630,500  1,218,600  68
Municipalities  obshitna  255  33,226  1,650  340,800
Czech  Republio  Districts  okres  75  133,300  50,000  230,000  78
1/  Municipalities  mesadky  urat  5,768  1,735  S0  1,200,000
Hungary  Counties  megye  19  SS7,447  212,000  1,956,800  61
.____  _  Municipalities  onko,rmanyzas  3,070  3,450  200<  243,000
Poland  Municipalities  gmynza  2,383  16,050  858  848,514  62
Romania  Counties  judea  41  564,672  237,900  2,318,900  53
Municipalities  munfc(pl/orasl  2,948  7,853  500  <  2,036,9W
commune
The Slovak  Distriis  okres  37  140,540  44,000  441,000  78
Republic  Municilities  okresni  urat  2,834  1,834  50<
Excluding  guope  which  is  utncth  di  and municipality.
2a  Data  are for Czechoslovakia  before  it  scparation  into  tho Czech  and Slovak  Republics
Source:  Depa_ment  of Statists,  Government  of Albania: data for other  countries  supplied  by  Felix  Jakob;  data on population  in urba  amas  from
World  Dcvelopment  Report,  1992  (Washington,  D. C.: World  DLnk,  IM),  Tablo  31, p. 278.
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MINISTRIES  WHICH SPEND
ATSUBNATIONAL LEVEL  Distdcts  Municipalities  Communes  National  TOTAL  Districts  Municipalities  Communes  National  TOTAL
Ministry  of Agriculture  & Food  133,700  -976,300  1,110,00a  12  - 8  100
Ministry of Construction  112,232  2,925,620  216,470  3,254,322  3  90  7  100
Ministry of Transport  677,445  188,300  1,525,255  2,391,000  28  8  - 64  100
Ministxy  of Education  169,132  882,541  1,444,552  1,259,645  3,755,870  5  23  38  34  100
Ministry  of Health  2,058,000  - 1,338,000  3,396,000  61  - - 39  100
OthersnI/  118,101  383,004  13,398  233,621  748,124  1C  51  2  31
TOTAL  3,26,610  I  4,379,46j  1,457,950  5,549,291  14,655,3161I_  22  30  10  3  1o
SBrne: Minity  of Finance  and  Economy,  Government  of Albania
1/  Ministry  of Culture,  Youth  mad  Sport;  Ministry  of Trade  and
Foreign  Economic  Relations.- 54 -
Table  S
Functions  Preseotly  under Conideration for Trafer  to Local
Governments  in Albania  and  Eflient  Fhaandng  of these Function 1t
;  m  - . .~~~~LtS  Usr  C,nt,a-:
.SERV'.CES.  Lol  lUwr-  Centiv  .
Tax.  Charges  Transfiers  Loans =
Public Utilities  (a)
Water supply  S  P  A
Seweage  S  P  A
Drainagp  P  P(b)  A
Markets  and abottoirs  S  P  (A)
Transporttion
Highways  and atrcs  P  P(b)  A
Public  s  S  P  (A)
Genncrl Urban Services (c)
Rfue  colection  P  (A)
Pub  and  ecratimon  P  (A)
Fir  proltction  P  (A)
General administration  P
Socia Sevces  (d)
Educaton (other tn  univesities)  P  (A)
Hea  (other hn  natonal filitie)  p  (A)
|Socia  Assistane  P
^mou:  P  =  Primary source of fuiance
S  =  Secondary source of finae
A  =  Borrowing is appropiat  for major capital expenditures
(A) =  Bozrowing  is approprate,  but likly  to account for a sall  share of total cos.
Source:  Adapted firn  Roy W. Bahl and Johanncs F. Linn,  ?The  Assigment of Local Govcmrment  Reveu  in
Developing Counities  in Tar  Assignment it Federal CDwabls, ed. Charles E. McLure, Jr.
(Canberra: Austrlian  National Universty Pess,  1983), p.  179.
it  Under the previous socialist  system only a fcw of the functions in the tabl  (such as utes  for
water  supply, electricity, pubLic  transit) were supported by user fees and the latecr  fcll far short of cost recvery.
(a)  Utilitics not being considcred fur tRnMsfr  to local govcrnments  include  eleticity  and teleommnicatios.
(b)  Development  chage  (i.e.,  special  aesamencs,  vloditon  charges, etc.) are appropriate for drinage,
higwys  and strects cspecially  where their  benefits are spatially well defined wihn  a juridito
(e)  Local law enforcement  is the princia  general urban service not being conidered  for tranfr  to local
governments.  (d)  k  is assumed that user charges and l  t  will play a leser  role in financing
social servics  for the foreseeable fiture.- 55 -
Table  6
Government  Revenue  and  Population  by Major Districts, Albania
Pr,ipor:on  or  Revenuem  U  Pzo 1'ugii  ul  IP'jiollo
,DiL,iicL :  *Janumry-NvcmL-er  192  1990
Tiau  24.2  11.5
Durrea  22.7  7.7
FMc  10.9  7.7
EPun  5.9  7.6
Koran  5.7  6.7
Othem  30.6  58.8
TOTAL  100.0  100.0
aurce:  Ministry  of Finance,  Goverrment  of Albania.- 56 -
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